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Planning, Programming and Bud^etin^; (PPBS) has survived
in the Deoartment of Defense (DOD) for the better oart of
twenty-five years. It has not only endured, but by most
accounts it has Droduced measurable imorovements in the
oreoaration of a credible budget for the defense
establishment. However, in sDite of budgeting; advances
exDerienced over this Deriod as a result of PPBS, there
continue to be oroblems with the system. This thesis
attemots to offer a broader understanding; of the significant
and subtle factors of p PBS success in the DOD. By examining
both the oroblems of the system which lead to the
introduction of PPBS and also the oroblems created as a
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
Although numerous management innovations have been
introduced in the past quarter century, few have been as
controversial as the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) developed for the Department of Defense (DOD)
in 1961 under the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.
Many in the field of Management Science still debate the
applicability and appropriateness of PPBS. [Ref. 1]
Moreover, considerable disagreement exists in literature as
to what PPBS was supposed to accomplish and what it actually
has done during its twenty-five year of existence. [Ref. 2]
This thesis with its broad system perspective will explore
some of the organizational problems associated with PPBS as
it has been generally practiced in DOD, with special
attention to comparative linkages to pre-PPBS problems.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis will address three basic questions. First,
what were the problems of the defense budget process that
lead to the introduction of PPBS in the DOD? Second, what
was the impact of the PPBS evolution on the defense budget
process? And third, after over 20 years of changes, are
there still unresolved problems plaguing the process?
C. DEFINING PPBS
PPBS is the formal process for making; resource
allocation decisions in the DOD. It is an annual,
sequential series of events leading to the develoDment,
approval, and execution of the DOD budget. [Ref. 31
The PPBS budget orocess was divided into three non-
familiar ohases; Planning, Programming, and Budgeting. The
Dlanning ohase theoretically would provide an assessment of
the threat and Drovide an integrated multi-year overview of
the direction in which the DOD should go. Planning guidance
for program develooment focuses on the oeriod two to nine
years into the future. The orogramming phase would have a
multi-year perspective design to meet the funding,
constraints, and the composition of forces identified in the
five year defense olan (FYDP).
The budgeting ohase would be limited to the first year
of the five-year olan. It is examined in great detail by
programs, and it is as accurate and comDlete as Dossible.
This final comoonent in the three ohases of PPB, coupled
with the first two phases, appeared to offer a sound and
rational system.
D. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PPBS IN DOD*
The concept of program budgeting, as applied to DOD, was
developed at The Rand Corporation in the 1950's. Before
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert McNamara, introduced
the concept in 1961, the individual military departments had
prepared their budgets following their individual interests
with relatively little outside guidance. During the pre-
PPBS period, the involvement of the SECDEF was largely
limited to dividing DOD's budget ceiling among the military
departments and reducing the departments' budgets, if they
exceeded their share of the pie. This was usually
accomplished through across-the-board cuts. There was both
little attempt and little ability within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to review the programmatic aspects of
the military department's budget submissions.
*This Section on the history of PPBS during the McNamara and
Laird years is drawn from the Lawrence Korb article, "The
Budget Process in the Department of Defense, 19^7 to 1977:
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Three Systems," Public
Administration Review, July/August 1977, pp. 33^-1^5^
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This early approach to budgeting had the following
problems
:
1. There was duplication of effort among the services
in various areas.
2. Service budgets were prepared largely independent
of one another with little balancing across services.
3- Services felt they were entitled to their fixed share
of the budget regardless of the effectiveness of their
programs or overall defense needs.
4. The budget process focused almost exclusively on the
next budget year, though the current decisions had
considerable consequences for future years.
5. Budget decisions were made largely independent of
plans
.
6. There was little analytical basis on which the SECDEF
could either make choices among competing service
proposals or assess the need for duplication in
service programs.
During the early years of PPBS, Robert McNamara entered
office as SECDEF determined to be an active participant in
preparing DOD's budget, and in choosing the weapons
developed and purchased by the military departments. He saw
the budget process as his vehicle for achieving these goals.
From the Rand Corporation, McNamara recruited Charles Hitch
and Alan Enthoven, two of the key architects of PPB for
defense and installed them in the Pentagon. PPB not only
offered a way for McNamara to gain the control he desired
over DOD, but also addressed each of the previously
described problems of the existing budget system.
11
Probably no SECDEF since McNamara has sought to exercise
the degree of detailed control that he did over the defense
program and budget. Since its inception, PPBS has been in a
constant state of evolution. It has had to serve
secretaries whose management philosophy and style favored
centralized control and direction, as well as those who
preferred a more decentralized approach. However, the basic
elements of the system-- three phases, program and budget
guidance to the services from the Secretary, OSD review of
the service program and budget proposals, and the use of
quantitative analysis to choose among competing programs--
have remained.
The following is a brief summary list of the
evolutionary changes of PPBS after the McNamara era. The
next chapter will discuss in more detail the impact of these
changes
.
1. The first major change in PPBS occurred under Melvin
Laird, who became SECDEF in 1969. The Office of
System Analysis no longer put forth independent
program proposals of its own but reviewed those put
forward by the services using specific budgetary
ceilings. The imposition of budget ceilings for the
programming phase of PPBS has become a permanent
feature of the system. Having the services propose
programs, rather than reacting or responding to
programs suggested by OSD, has become the norm as
well. The type of review by OSD, primarily the degree
of detail in which the service proposals are reviewed,
varies with the management style and preference of the
SECDEF.
The type of programmatic guidance provided to the
services for use in preparing their 5-year programs
has also varied over the years. Again, the
differences have been centered primarily around the
degree of specificity contained in the guidance, and
thus the degree of central control exercised by OSD
12
over the programming process.
During the Carter administration, Zero Based Budgeting
(ZBB) was instituted with limited success. The goal
of ZBB was to more clearly identify marginal programs.
With its array of decision packages at three different
"bands", or resource levels, ZBB was viewed by some as
being little more than a technique for providing the
SECDEF and OSD with greater opportunity for altering
service program proposals.
In 1979, the "Rice Study" [ref 4] of PPBS led to the
Defense Resources Board (DRB) being formed.
Consisting of the various Under Secretaries and
Assistant Secretaries in OSD, plus the Chairman of the
JCS, the board worked to identify those major issues
in program review deserving of the SECDEF'S attention.
The board itself was to resolve lesser issues.
The Reagan administration under a concept of
decentralization, broadened the board's membership to
include the service secretaries. This was done with
the belief that the service viewpoints were important
and useful, and that fewer decisions, would be
contested if the services were represented on the
board that debated the issues. The operational
experience of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) of the
Unified and Specified Commands has been brought to
bear through briefings they provide to the DRB on the
prior year's Defense Guidance (DG). Along with
this, other aspects of PPBS were modified by what was
called the "Carlucci Initiatives". Chapter IV of this
study will address these efforts in more detail.
E. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
In reviewing PPBS, it is useful to understand that PPBS
must function in a broader political, economic, and
management environment. The study conducted by the Joint
DOD/GAO working group on PPBS use the label "Environmental
Realities" in describing these factors. [Ref. 3:pp. 23-28]
The fact that PPBS must accommodate these factors is
acknowledged and the below list is provided and viewed as
13
significant to the readers aDDreciation of their influences
on the DOD budget process.
1 . National E c onomic Conditions
The relative health of the economy, the rate of
inflation or deflation, and other economic factors all helo
determine the amount of resources the nation's leadershiD
will devote to defense.
In a democracy with shared legislative and executive
Dowers, national economic considerations are essentially
Dolitical and policy judgments by the President and the




, International Treaties and Commitments
America's worldwide interest and commitments are a
fundamental Dart of the environment in which PPBS oDerates.
They Drovide the very basis for determining the tyoe of
threats, and help define the contribution we and our allies
can be expected to make to Drotect shared interests against
a common threat. The definition of the threat against U.S.
interest is the starting point for all defense olanning and
subsequent events in PPBS.
14
3 . Congressional Concerns
A major resDonsibility of any member of Congress is
to reDresent the needs and concerns of his/her geographic
areas and constituents, balancing these with the broader
interest of the nation. These congressional concerns as
seen by many Deriodically in conflict. The Congress does
require DOD to spend money on weapons systems and ODerations
(e.g., bases) that DOD has not requested. Congressional
concerns 3nd wishes must be considered early in the
programming and budgeting Dhases of PPBS. It is better to
anticipate and accommodate congressional desires in the
building of programs, than have the Drograms adjusted later
to reflect congressional Driorities and concern.
1 • Timing Appreciati ons
It has become the norm, rather than the exception,
for the DOD to begin the fiscal year without annual
appropriations. This requires operating part of the year on
continuing resolutions, which does not provide the same
level of funding as the appropriation acts. As a result,
some projects must be postponed, it becomes necessary to
squeeze budget execution into a shorter time period; and
the uncertainty and work intensiveness of preparing the next
year's budget for the next PPBS cycle, remains in doubt.
15
Needless to say, late approDria tions comDlicate and
efficient the orderly execution of programs and budgets, and
magnify the work intensity of PPBS.
5 . Successive Admini strations
Historically, management of DOD has swung between a
centralized decisionmaking Drocess or a decentralized
orocess. Basically coincidingd with changes in
oresidential administrations, each of the two management
systems call for different tyoes of resource and management
information
.
PPBS must be sufficiently flexible in design and
ODeration to accommodate the different managerial
ohilosophies and objectives of successive secretaries and
administrations.
5 . Service Compe tition for Res ource
Comoetition among the services for finite resources
is a fundamental feature of resource allocation in DOD. The
differing, and often comDeting, perspectives, needs, and
responsibilities of the services, OSD, and JCS must be
clearly understood in assessing PPBS and recommending system
modification. From this comoetition can soring much of the
innovation and momentum toward efficiency that is essential
to getting the largest return on national investments in
15
defense. The challenge of PPBS is to channel, and use, that
oomoetition without either allowing it to get out of control
or stifling it.
7 . Perso nnel Tur nove r
The DOD has regular, rather raoid turnover of its
too civilian oolicyma'<ers , oarticularly Presidential
aooointees. The average tenure at about 3 years. In
addition, the military services rotate their career military
oersonnel regularly. This turnover in both too civilian and
career military personnel olaces a oremium on the continuity
of civil servants and military oersonnel whose careers
follow a Darticular SDecialty.
Notwithstanding, PPBS must operate in a environment
in which Deoole with imoortant resource allocation
resoonsibil ities at all levels are not necessarily familiar
with PPBS Drocess. Thus PPBS information and orocedures
must be able to accommodate a wide variety of exoerience and
knowledge among the DarticiDants .
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3 . Decisionmaking _by Committee
PPBS decisions are made, in larq;e oart, by various
committees within DOD and the military departments. These
committees neither keeo minutes of their meeting nor provide
written rationale for their decisions, which may be
circulated widely. This feature of PPBS decisionmaking has
been much discussed and debated. Defenders argue that
making decisions by committee allows a wide range of views
to be considered and orovides a sense of participation in,
and commitment to the decision reached. The lack of minutes
of meetings encourages a frank exchange of views without
the necessity to sneak "for the record." On the other hand,
critics say that the lack of minutes obscures the rationale
for the decisions reached; making it difficult to hold
anyone accountable; and that it fails to orovide a record of
decisionmaking for later assessment and review. The
strengths and weaknesses of decisionmaking bv committee in
PPBS should be understood and keot in mind as or\e reviews
the system. Given the complexity of the PPBS information
review and integration task, the existence of committees
appears necessary.
9 . Civilian-Military Responsibilities
PPBS can be viewed within the context of the
interaction of the two major resDonsibilities of D0D--(1)
setting national defense policy and choosing resources to
1*
enhance the military defense caoability in the future and
(2) oreoarin^ war olans and maintaining ooerational forces
that orovide maximum military caoability with the resources
on hand today. Civilians within DOD olay the major role in
the first arena, while the second is orimarily the orovince
of the military, oarticularly the JCS and the Unified and
Soecified Commanders.
Civilian control of the military is a fundamental
orinciDlc of the Reoublic. However, differences in
management aooroach among secretaries of defense, and the
decree and tyoe of control they try to exercise in PP3S, and
DOD generally, reflect differing underlying ohilosoohies
about the role of civilians in DOD. Coooeration between the
military and civilian oersonnel is necessary for PPBS, and
DOD as a whole, to be effective.
17
. Scooe
In the last 25 years, the evolutionarily orocess of PPBS
has received an ebb-and-flow of attention in the literature.
There were oeriods during which PPBS was the subject of
extensive orofessional writing; by contrast, there were also
bleak intervals, during which little or no literature was
oublished. However, the scooe of the literature is
extensive enough in data to merit several thesis, if all the
asDects of the PPBS were considered. Therefore this
research has two imoortant limitations.
19
1 . Timeframe
There are two oeriods in time from which the study
will he focused. The early 1960 T s, the oeriod of time just
orior to the introduction of D PPS and the early 1930's,
twenty years later. The study will examine the maior
changes to PPBS between these two oeriods, from the
standooint of their imoact on the D PPS orocess.
°-
• Practi cal ^ r.amewor'^
The research is also limited to surveying the OOH's
abilities to out PPBS into use as the solution to its budget
oroblems of the early 1960's, and assessing; the alleged
oractical shortfalls in the early IQ^O's.
0. Assumotion
It is assumed that the reader has some limited general
knowledge of the Don's P^PS. A consolidated listing of
abbreviations and acronyms is orovided in an Aooendix. It
will identify the DOD terms contained in the thesis.
H. Methodology
In oreoaring this thesis, I relied on a comorehens ive
review of reoresenta tive literature (books, articles
oublished in orofess ional- in teres t journals, congressional,
documents, unoubl ished memoranda, etc.).
20
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II. THE BUDGET PROCESS PRIOR TO PPBS
A. BACKGROUND
From the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947
through 1961, the budget format or process within the
department was virtually unchanged. [Ref . 5] Before
addressing the first question, "what were the problems that
lead to the introduction of PPBS in DOD? , a look back at
what was called "traditional" budgeting, as it was practiced
in DOD prior to 1961 is necessary.
The budget process would begin about a year before the
budget was to be submitted to the Congress. During the mid-
1950's, the budget process would start with a series of
cabinet meetings and National Security Council meetings,
which established the first step--the imposition of a fiscal
ceiling on DOD by the Administration. Dominating these
meetings, President Eisenhower, like his Democratic
predecessor, was concerned with a balanced budget and
decreed that no more than 10 percent of the gross national
product would go to defense. This was done with little
regard to those events in the international arena which
appeared to dictate an increase in defense spending.
A case in point: in January 1957, President Eisenhower
requested $35.5 billion for DOD during FY 1958. Within the
next ten months, the Soviet Union shocked the American
public and the world by launching the first intercontinental
22
ballistic missile and orbiting the first Sputnic satellite.
In light of these dramatic Soviet advances, the Congress and
the public expected some spectacular new initiatives in the




After the President made his decision on the ceiling of
the defense budget,, the Secretary of Defense would go back
to the Pentagon with budgetary target figures and task the
DOD budget Director to allocate the budget ceiling amount
among the three services.
It should be noted here that throughout the period 1947-
1961, with the exception of the Korean War, the services-
received virtually fixed shares of the total defense budget
amount: the Air Force, 47 percent; the Navy 29 percent; and
the Army 24 percent. Each of the services would in turn
prepare its basic budget submission by dividing its own
ceiling among its own functions, units, and activities.
This system allowed the service secretaries to function as
line-officer managers for their respective departments.
As the services prepared their budget, they were to be
guided by two planning documents: The Basic National
Security Policy Document (BNSP) and the Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP). For reasons which will be discussed
later in this paper, there was in effect no definitive
guidance provided by these two planning documents for
services. Therefore, in building their budgets, the
23
individual services were free to emphasize those portions to
their programs and missions which they felt contributed most
to national security and strategic objectives. Each service
could justify exceeding its budgetary ceiling because it
could legitimately claim that it alone was providing the
nation's security. As a result, each October the budget for
the services was sent to the Secretary of Defense not only
unbalanced but in excess of the Presidential ceiling.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
job of reducing the services' requests fell to the DOD
Budget Director and his staff. Their task was to bring the
accumulated service requests into line with the
Administration's ceilings.
Mr. John E. Keller, who worked as one of the DOD Budget
staffers during this period, described the across-the-board
reduction process:
It is now roughly the first of October. The budget has to
go to bed around the first of December. So, you now
have 60 days to stuff $80 billion worth of programming and
planning into a $40 billion fiscal strai t j acket . That is
not surgery, that is mayhem, and the weapon of choice is
not a scalpel, but a meat-ax. Come the first of December,
we had a $40 billion "plan and program" to fit inside the
$40 billion budget. But all that new balance and
symmetry that had gone into the original JSOP, needless
to say, was destroyed. The bits and pieces were lying
around the shop floor in bloody hunks."
. . .[the] raw bits and pieces that had survived the
"program budget review" were stitched together in the form
of the Secretary's posture statement and made to sound
like we knew what we were doing." [Ref. 7]
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consequence of this up-front realization was to increase
agreement amon^; the oarticioants (competition) in the budget
orocess: it also "tended to reduce the amount of
conflict"
.
[Ref. B] However, these perceived advantages are
far outweighed by the oroblems seen by other -authors,
including r<orb.
C. THE PROBLEMS 0^ TRADITIONAL BUDGETING
'•Jhat was found to be oerhaos the most imoortant defect
in the ore-lQSl system was the almost comolete seoaration
between olanning and decision-making on weaoon systems and
forces, on one hand, and budgeting on the other. [Ref. 9:o.
32] There was some planning done by the National Security
Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as reflected in the
Basic National Security Policy Document and the Joint
Strategic Objectives D lan, but these documents were
bifurcated and comoletely unrelated to fiscal reality.
The Basic National Security Dolicy Document
theoretically was a comorehensive statement of American
strategic oolicy, that was intended to orovide planning
guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services ir.
their Dlanning for force and weapons levels. Rather than
resolving the share differences of ooinion over what the
strategic oolicy of the United States should be, it glossed
over them to make the document acceotable to all oarties.
[Ref. 5:o. 3351
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The DOD budget itself was thus converted into a nice,
neat and tidy Dacka»e--within the constraints imoosed by the
President .
3. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS
The brief descriotion above, orovides a basic
aooreciation of the "traditional" budgeting methodology and
sets the stage for understanding the criticisms of it, and
the suooort for a new system.
The literature reviewed for this study suggests numerous
exolanations for the institution of PPBS. Among them were
such reasons as to consolidate the Budget Process in DOD, to
orovide the Secretary of Defense with a general management
tool for controlling DOD, to link consideration of military
force issues to cost-budget issues, and to correct the
defense resource allocation orocess from an imout to an
outout orientation. However, the orevailing theme of most
of the authors, was that PPBS was instituted as a means of
correcting the various Droblems evident in the "status quo"
(Traditional Budgeting). Not every author saw the
traditional orocess as being wholly undesirable. To some
decree, Lawrence vorb saw the overall budget control figure
received by DOD from the Administration as beneficial in
that it gave both the Secretarv of Defense and the Services
a true oicture of fiscal reality at the outset of the
orocess. According to Aaron Wildavsky , the maicr
The basic National Security Policy Document was sent to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff after its completion, to serve as
a guide for the development of the Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan is the
document intended to assess the threat and prescribe the
military forces that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed to
be required to meet the military strategy and national
objectives. In view of the fact that the guidance in the
Basic National Security Policy Document could be interpreted
in so many ways, the three service chiefs attempted to
stress that portion of the guidance that enhanced the
primary missions of their respective services. As a result,
the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan was really three
separate plans pasted together and labeled "joint." [Ref.
10]
Each of these documents, the Basic National Security
Policy Document and Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, were
essentially useless as guidance for planning and had no real
relevance to the budget process. A budget constrained along
these lines did not permit the Secretary of Defense or the
President to tell what provision was being made to increase
the capacity to defend the United States, to engage in
operations, etc. [Ref. 9:p. 33]
As a result of this lack of integrated planning, there
were other significant problems in the traditional system
found in the literature:
27
1 . ^plication Of Effort
Virtually complete latitude was accorded the
services in determining how they wished to soend their
particular share of the overall fiscal target given to 00D
.
Lack of centralized control over oro^rans— or even any
substantive programmatic guidance—created inevitable
duplications of effort, with the services independently
pursuing similar mission and policy objectives. "or
example, in the case of the prestigious area of strategic
offense, in which the guidance was so loosely worded as to
allow each service to interpret its own role, independently
of the other two, each service was committing resources to
its own intercontinental ballistic missile system program.
2 . Negle ct Of .Important . Mi.s.s ions.
Just as the lack of central control /guidance with
regard to programs permitted duplication of effort, it also
resulted in the failure to attend to all areas that might be
deemed essential to national defense. c or example, the Air
^orce during the 1950's gave overriding priority to its
bombers and missiles; no one forced them to oav attention to
the more mundane area of tactical air operations (which were
essential to supporting Army's ground operations').
Consequently, such areas received paupers' rations.
Similarly, the Navy felt that aircraft carriers
deserved priority, at the expense of antisubmarine warfare
and escort functions. The result of these and other*
?<*•
numerous examoles was an imbalanced force structure, that
left some orograms/missions/ob jec tives over-funded, while
others were covered inadequately or not at all.
The traditional budgeting orocess had no mechanism to
orotect against either exigency. "Out defense oosture was
not very well balanced." [Ref. 11:p. M
1 • Fair Share, Versus Meed
A third oerceived oroblem of the traditional
orocess is that each service was aooarently led to believe
that it was guaranteed a given Drooortion of the total
defense budget alloted to DOu . The exolanation for this
ohenomenon is twofold. T irst, with the exceotion of the
Korean War years, exoerience had followed a fairly
oredictable oattern from 1947 through 196I— over the years,
each services share was virtually fixed (Mr corce had the
lion's share of 47 oercent; Navy 29 oercent; and Army ?4
oercent). Secondly, no one had an effective means of
assessing the effectiveness of a service's programs vis-a-
vis the requirements of national defense.
4 . cocus On A Single Year
The limited time horizon of traditional budgeting--
one vear at time--forced non ' s budget formulators to
concentrate almost wholly uoon current costs, with scant
regard to future costs (much less future effectiveness).
This meant an effective concentration on ooerations rathe"
than investment exoendi tures .
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5 . Ohggsin^ _\monq; Comgetin ,x -Items
The traditional aooroach, with its line-item
orientation and near-total concentration on input (the
resources to be soent), rather than cutout (what those
resources mi^ht buy), orovided no rational cri teria for the
Secretary of Defense to decile which orooosed exoend itu^e
should be funded in the event that the overall DOD ceiling
could not cover all orooosals. Since what the services
annually submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
tyoically added uo to aoorox ima tel v ?00 percent of the DOD
ceiling, the Secretary of Defense (and his comptroller)
could deal with inevitable service comoetition decisions--
or
,
as described earlier in this chanter," the neat-ax
aooroach." The oroblem was repeated at lower levels, by
service chiefs attempting to decide which efforts should
receive funding.
^ • Planning Ve rsus
,
Bud %e t in*
This finding mi^ht have been synonymously titled,
"objectives versus soendin*." The input-focus of
traditional bud<*etin<? carried numerous consequences for
meeting national security objectives. Given a eomolete
absence of anv mechanism for relating olannine; to budget
decisions, the traditional aooroach left the attainment of
oolicy objectives to chance.
•John Dawson is one of several critics who see this as
one of the foremost difficulties of defense resource
30
decision-making during the 1950's: "the distinct separation
of longer range, requirements-oriented military force




By January 196-1 there had been quiet but longstanding
recognition of these problems and the fact that the defense
budget was a budget that could not translate resources into
objectives, could not project the future resource
implications of proposed, and that did not distinguish
between one-time investments and recurring, or annual
operating expenses. [Ref. 9:p.86] This chapter suffices to
outline the problems of the Pre-PPBS Budget process and,
identify the "why" requirements for a new system. From this
point we can now move on to look at this new system called
PPBS, the DOD's solution to it's Budget problems.
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III. PPBS IN THE POD, THE FIRST 20 YEARS
A. THE PPBS PROMISE FOR DOD
In January 1961, there was a well-established legal
basis for change, the establishment of a new administration.
It was in the context of change that the Kennedy
Administration, under Robert McNamara as Secretary of
Defense, embarked upon the planning for its military
activities. One of the major features targeted was the
recognition of the requirement for a method for integrating
resources programming and budgeting into military planning.
President Kennedy had made it very plain in his speeches
that he wanted not only an improvement in our strategic
retaliatory forces, but also a major redressing of the
imbalance in our conventional and strategic forces. With
the objective clear, it was the task of the Secretary of
Defense to establish a system to make the required changes.
As pointed out in the introduction of this thesis there
was a need for a management tool which would allow the
Secretary of Defense to view DOD at a level above the
services. Since the mid-1950's, the Rand Corporation used a
planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) to
analyze defense in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
In staffing the Pentagon, McNamara recruited two of the Rand
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Corporation's most distinguished analysts, Charles Hitch and
Alan Enthoven, and together with these two, introduced PPBS
into the Department of Defense.
With PPBS, there is a single integrated planning-
programming-budgeting process entailing (1) the planning and
review of requirements, (2) the formulation and review of
programs extending -several years into the future, and (3)
the development of the annual budget estimates. The new
procedure was to:
(1) Provide for more orderly, continuous program
review in contrast to the hectic program-
budget review crammed into just a few
months a year, which had been the practice
in the past;
(2) Disclose the full financial implications of
program decisions;
(3) Keep future military planning roughly in
balance with probable resources and dollar
availabili t ies--thereby minimizing the number
of false starts and reducing the number of
marginal and excessive support programs; and
(4) Promote unified, balanced overall defense
programs in place of unilaterally balanced
Army, Navy, and Air Force Programs. [Ref. 11:p.4]
Moreover, the major benefits that PPBS promise are those
which address more directly the problems of the previous
system.
(1) PPBS Allowed the decision-makers in the budget
process in DOD to make decisions based upon the
explicit criteria of national interest.
(2) PPBS considered mi 1 i tary /forces and cost/budget
together
.
(3) PPBS Provided for the consideration of alternative
solutions in which costs, forces, and strategies
have to be considered together.
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(4) PPBS allowed the base program to compete equally
with new programs.
B. THE IMPACT OF CHANGE
As pointed out in of the introductory chapter, PPBS's
flexibility has accommodated a number of environmental
factors, one of which being successive administrations. On
the premise that a new Presidential Administration typically
results in some change to the status quo, plus the fact that
new innovation was widely publicized; it was anticipated
that the PPBS within DOD might have been subjected to some
significant revisions during the first 20 years,
particularly under the administrations of Nixon/Ford and
Carter. However, the literature reviewed did not suggest
this to be the case. In fact, apparently few substantive
changes to the practical process itself occurred during this
period, despite the widely publicized attempts to implement
(yet two more) innovations in management-- in this case,
"Management by Objectives" and "Zero-Base Budgeting."
Section C. and D. of this chapter will discuss the
impact of both in more detail.
C. THE IMPACT OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES (MBO)
Actually the two Nixon-Ford administrations of MBO
wrought only one significant change to how PPBS operated
within DOD, a shift to decentralize some of the decision
making. This change involved not the mechanics of the
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process, but the degree to which participants held
authority. Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, appears to
have left the process itself well alone. His contribution
to the overall system operation was to desolve the power
somewhat, moving away from what Hanson Baldwin called the
"McNamara monarchy."
This decentralization was by no means radical, however.
Far from completely turning over resource allocation
decision-making authority to the services, Laird simply
"gave them more programming initiative." [Ref. 13:p. 570]
Nothing suggests that he gave them complete authority,
but rather merely increased their voice in the process.
Final approval remained in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. In fact, at the same time Laird was increasing
"participatory management" of his service secretaries in
making "programmatic decisions", he was moving in the
opposite direction, centralizing the acquisition system.
Since acquisition must be viewed as a subset of the overall
PPBS, this seems almost in direct conflict with the
"participatory management" initiative.
Puritano credited Laird with placing "program initiation
firmly with the services." [Ref. l4:p. 12] However, the
move to centralize acquisition left final approval firmly
seated with the Secretary of Defense. Albert C. Pierce, a
senior research fellow at the National Defense University
(and former Assistant Secretary of Defense) emphasized that
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although the Nixon-Ford era gave the services "more
operating room," "systems analysis in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense still played a role." [Ref. 1 5 : p • ^8]
In summary, then, no major revision had occurred.
Although Service Secretaries might purpose, SECDEF should
dispose. Perhaps Laird's "move toward decentralization" can
be appreciated only .in relationship to McNamara's monarchy.
D. THE IMPACT OF ZERO-BASE BUDGETING
In 1977, the expected happened when a new President of a
different political party than his predecessor took office:
changes were imposed on how the Federal government operated.
An allegedly major change was imposed on resource
allocation decision-making: the innovation of Zero-Base
Budgeting. President Carter, an enthusiastic proponent of
what he advertised as representing a radical revision (and
improvement) to existing Federal government budget
procedures, had used the ZBB process during his one term as
Governor of Georgia.
The effects of ZBB differed from agency to agency. The
Department of Defense had far different experience with the




ZBB Did Not Represent A major Revision To PPBS
Despite the protestations of the spokesmen of later
Administrations, Carter's innovation in budgeting did not
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constitute any truly significant change in how DOD was
making resource--allocat ion decisions. This is explained by
several factors.
a. Similarity of System Objectives
To begin with, the published objectives to ZBB
had a lot in common with those advertised for PPBS 16 years
earlier. For instance, ZBB was intended to:
(1) Focus budgeting on a comprehensive analysis of
objectives and needs;
(2) Combine planning and budgeting into one process ;
(3) Lead managers to analyze their programs in terms
of cost effectiveness. [Ref. 1 6 : p . 36]
Every objective was already in place in DOD.
b. Similarity of Techniques
Since the systems themselves shared many common
objectives, it followed that the means to achieving those
ends would not be dissimilar. This proved to be the case in
DOD.
For instance, the "decision package" structure
mandated by ZBB was nothing more or less than the Program
Element structure designed by Charles Hitch. [Ref. 1 7 : p . 7]
The furor other agencies experienced in (once again!)
attempting to derive a programmatic orientation to their
budgets involved little more in DOD than the aggregation of
existing Program Element codes into "decision Packages." If
this sounds like little more than an exercise in relabeling,
that's about all it was.
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Perhaps the most frequent criticism of ZBB was that it
created a massive increase in documentation involved In
budget submissions. This was certainly the case in DOD, as
well as in other agencies. However, the types of
documentation involved (for example, justification of
proposed expenditure on programmatic grounds) were not novel
to DOD PPBS participants. It was simply a matter of doing
more of the same.
Many of the ZBB techniques not already in existence
were of a nature similar enough to PPBS tools to allow
analysts to develop and implement them fairly quickly. In
summary, ZBB was not a radical departure from the way PPBS
operated, but rather a collection of additional procedural
and reporting requirements.
2
. Prioritization Represented The Only Real Innovation
Of Significance
One aspect of ZBB did represent a substantial
departure from the existing PPBS methodology: the
requirement to prioritize programs within the overall budget
submission. This had been happening de facto (as it could
be argued will always be the case in allocating scarce
resources over excessive demands). However, there had never
been a formal requirement to both prioritize programs, and
document that prioritization.
This became the single most difficult aspect of
implementing ZBB to the President's satisfaction. Intrinsic
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to the prioritization was the requirement to propose three
different funding levels for each program. DOD budgeteers
were able to comply with this by taking a programmatic view-
catergor izing programs according to an overall scheme
ranging from "most critical" to "dispensable." [Ref. 1 6 : p
.
37] However, the need to devise hit lists of proposed
decrements remained .traumatic
.
Arguably, the groundwork for prioritization was
already present in PPBS methodology, in the emphasis of
formulation of alternatives. Albeit DOD officials may have
disliked having to choose among their programs--impl ici tly
admitting which ones were not really needed— the
prioritization could be seen as a vertically oriented
version (different levels of the same program) of the
horizontal approach already practiced (selecting among
different programs). That is, the requirement to submit
three proposed levels of funding for each program could be
translated into simply multiplying the total number of
alternatives by three. For many, it became little more than
a paperwork exercise.
Some of the management literature maintains that the
prioritization requirement constituted nothing of substance.
"Honest agency heads will admit," he said "that program
priority is influenced by the amount of funds likely to be
available, rather than the other way around." [Ref. 24]
Nothing in literature indicates that this was disproved by
39
actual experience of ZBB within the Department of Defense
( or elsewhere ) .
3 . ZBB Represented A Return Toward Centralization
As discovered in researching the Nixon-Ford era,
what had been advertised as a reversal of McNamara's near
total centralization of decision-making was far from
radical. However,, the introduction of ZBB formalized a
return to centralized decision-making. Agencies were
expected to review the program prioritizations in detail
with this review to take place at top-management level. In
DOD, the various services used some form of management
council to carry out such reviews (in the Air Force, a
structure called the Air Force Board, was already in place).
[Ref. I6:p. 38]
Once the individual services had submitted their
proposals to OSD, the review procedure was repeated at the
DOD level. Robert Anthony points out that DOD's budget was
some thirty times the size of Georgia's, thus making it
ludicrous to assume that top-level management would possibly
manage the sheer numbers of "major budget issues" ZBB
created. [Ref. 1 7 : p . 7]
Driessnack (who was a Major General in the Air Force's
budget office during the ZBB years) agreed that the number
of major budget issues submitted for executive review was
unwieldy. Later, Reagan appointees felt this to be one of
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What is obvious in this chapter is that despite the
attempts of major management innovations over two decades
and four Presidential Administrations; PPBS has emerged with
relatively few revisions to the practical process. As a
result, the impact on the overall DOD budget operation
during this period has been minimum. However, the effect of
these changes, as related to the perceived problems of the
PPBS in 1981 has yet to be addressed. Chapter IV will
explore this from the perspective of another new
Presidential Administration.
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IV THE CARLUCCI INITIATIVE: THE 1981 ATTEMP AT CHANGE
A. Introduction
As PPBS approached its twentieth anniversary in DOD, the
system was subjected, once again, to a new Presidential
Administration, of a different political party, with a
series of changes. . This most recent attempt to reform the
DOD budgeting process, came to be known as the "CARLUCCI
INITIATIVES". Like the two other significant systemwide
changes attempted over the previous two decades, many viewed
the Carlucci Initiatives of 1981 as yet another attempt to
clean house in DOD.
B. Why The Change In 1981?
Before discussing the changes and their impact on the
PPBS process, the question of "why the Reagan Administration
felt it was impelled to modify PPBS in 1981 must first be
addressed
.
As one would suspect at this point, the literature
supports the notion that the modifications to PPBS by Reagan
appointees Caspar Weinberger, Frank Carlucci, and Vincent
Puritano attempted, among other things, to undo some of the
more noteworthy innovations of the previous incumbents. For
instance, one of the first changes to be widely publicized
was the elimination of Carter's attempt at Zero-Base
Budgeting
M2
In his first month in office, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger put his Deouty Secretary, ^rank Carlucci, in
charge of studying the overall PPBS. As miq;ht be exoected,
the study q;rouo found numerous areas which they (the new
administration) felt their Democratic Dredecessors had left
in less-than-ootimum condition.
Vincent Puritano who would eventually be aooointed the
Assistant Secretary of Defense ( Comotroller ) served as
Carlucci's oroject manager for the study/revision orocess.
Puritano organized a 30 day review of the PPBS, with "full
Darticioation of all OSC staffs, the services, and JCS."
[Ref. 14: d. 9] Puritano summed uo what his task force found
to be the three most significant difficulties with the PPBS
they inherited:
1. Planning that failed to "take fiscal realities
into account;
2. A system that had »rown "tooheavy and congested
with Daoer work and excessive detail;"
3. Both oro^ram and budget Dhases characterized
with a "orol iferation of structures and data
bases" that "inhibited the smooth flow of the
PPBS cycle."
Puritano conceded that while "the system was still
meeting its basic objectives, it clearly had room for
imorovement. [Ref. 14:o. 10] That imorovement, he oromis^d,
would result from the 32 initiatives named after his boss.
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C. The Preceived Problems
Puritano attributed the oroblems in DOD ' s PPBS to what
he called "system-wide distortions" created by a "^0-year
accretion of differing objectives and management styles,"
He saw the twenty years as three distinct eras (YcNamara,
Laird, and Carter), each of which contributed "major and
DOtentially conflicting characteristics embedded in the
PPBS." [Ref. 14:o. 10]
1. He blamed McMamara's design of interoosing OSD
orogramming direction "between the JCS olanning
orocess and the service budgeting," leaving OSD
without an effective orogram review caoability.
2. He saw Laird's oarticiDatory management initiative as
simoly an "overlay" onto the McMamara design, which
devolved some orogramming discretion to the services.
Moreover, although Laird's oartic ioatory management
had ffiven programming authority to the services,
certain "centralization trends" offset the ootential
benefits of the decentralization attemot. He saw this
trend as a continuation of OSD directive guidance to

























































































































































































D. The Preceived Consequences
The .three eras of conflicting management styles and
objectives left several unhaooy legacies, according to
Puritano. They are as follow:
1. There was a confusion of line and staff relationshios
between OSD and the services. " DOD had never
addressed the discontinuities created by the
imoosition of OSD orogramming between JCS olanning and
service budgeting," he- maintained . [Ref. 14:o. 13]
2. Puritano cited as another consequence of the three
competing systems in the evolution of PPBS was the
exDansion of various information systems involved, to
the extent that a "variety of comoeting formats,
structures, and data banks had evolved. . .(leading)
to duDlication of data requests and DaDerwork
overloads." [Ref. 14:p. 13]
3. Puritano saw numerous instances of decision being
revisited throughout the orocess as PPBS operated in
1931. "Issues decided in the orogramming ohase were
often resurrected in the budgeting Dhase by all
oartic iDants
,
OSD,OMB, and the services," he sa'id,
categorizing the overall oroblem as a case of
overmanagement
.
4. Puritano also scored the system in 1931 as
overlooking execution:
The emohasis and rewards were focused on the front-
end justification of orograms and the obtaining of
aoorooriations . . . {with} the time of managers at
all levels of DOD... scent on sheeoherding their
orograms through the various PPBS cycles.
[Ref. 14:o. 14]
5. Puritano's 1931 assessment also cited neglect of
strategic olanning functions in PPBS, since the "only
limited feedback to oolicy makers and orogrammers was
built into the systems." [Ref. 14:o. 14]
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E. The 1981 Changes
The discussion presented above provides for us the
context in which the Carlucci Initiatives were developed.
The designers Lawrence Korb then Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics and
Puritano, claimed that the Carlucci Initiatives (32 in all)
represented significant improvements to the PPBS.
Challenging this assertion for all 32 (many of which
involved refinement to the Aquisition process) would be
beyond the scope of this study. However, two aspects of
PPBS modified by the Carlucci Initiatives are of relevance
to the broad topic of this thesis, (1) the shift in
management control, and (2) revisions to the planning phase
of PPBS.
1
. Shifting Management Control
Included in Carlucci's 32 Initiatives, was what was
termed the "golden management formula; centralized policy
responsibility in OSD and decentralized operational
responsibility to the services." "This," promised Korb and
Puritano, "should mean more precisely defined responsibility
and accountability for results at the operating level."
Under the initiative, OSD staffs were envisioned as being
able to. concentrate on the "more appropriate central staff
function.
. .rather than detailed program direction as in
previous years." OSD analytical efforts would "emphasize
cross-service and cross-command analysis. . .to help the
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secretary make the high priority decisions that only he or
she can make." OSD would eliminate "most of the detailed
directives of the past" and limit the number of major issues
brought to OSD level. [Ref. 1 3 : P . 572]
Another initiative mentioned in the intro'duction, a
legacy from the Carter Administration, was the Defense
Resource Board. The DRB was composed of top-level OSD
appointees (Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the Service
Secretaries, the Associate Director of OMB, and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Under the restructuring
ordered by the Carlucci Initiates, the membership was
expanded from 12 to 18 members. The DRB was envisioned by
Carlucci and Puritano as taking the major responsibility for
the policy-making intrinsic to PPBS, and managing the entire
PPBS process. (The analogy to the corporate board of
director found in the private sector).
Carlucci himself articulated the philosophy behind the
separation of policy making from policy execution, which he
termed "controlled decentralization".
. . .working with the Service Secretaries, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, and OSD staff the Secretary
{of Defense} and I will concentrate on major policy
decision, definition of planning goals and the allocation
of resources necessary to strengthen the horizontal
integration of our four Services into a balanced Armed
Forces Team to meet our national military strategy. . .we
will hold each of the Service Secretaries responsible for
the development and execution of the necessary programs
and the day-to-day management of the resources under
their control... This will focus Service management
efforts on improving the operational efficiency of
department
.
[Ref . I8:p. A. 2]
M7
If the Carlucci Initiatives fulfilled this promises of
their designers, OSD staffs would be engaged primarily in
"broad policy guidance for the services, "limiting
analytical efforts to issues that cross service or major
military command lines. [Ref. 1 5 : p . 45]
2 . Adjustments To The Planning Phase
One of .the important themes of the Carlucci
Initiatives involved improvements to strategic planning
during the early planning throughout the other phases of the
system. This would involve a "more disciplined planning
process that will provide the framework, the goals and
objectives, the appropriate military strategies, and the
risks associated with the optimum allocation of available
resources .. .based on military requirements that flow from a
realistic assessment of near-term and long-term threats.
[Ref. I8:p. A. 4]
The essence of his attempts to strengthen planning
involved greater participation in PPBS activities by the
military leadership (including operational commanders) who
theretofore had not been deeply involved. The Defense
Resources Board was to take an active role in reviewing and
approving the strategy emerging from the planning phase, to
"ensure that policy is reflected in the resulting programs
and budgets." [Ref. 15:p. 48]
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F. Summary
This chapter has provided the final accounting of
changes to the PPBS process. PPBS is a process which was
conceived as a better way of making budgetary decisions.
Each of the two preceding innovations (MBO and ZBB) , were
seen as new approaches to the basic PPBS concept; with the
goal of a better decision making process for DOD. Like its
two predecessors, the Carlucci Initiatives was also viewed
as providing "an intelligent framework, which capitalizes
over three decades of experience in DOD... The success of
this approach "will ultimately be judged on the quality of
the budgetary decisions that are made" [Ref. 1 3 : P - 574] The
information presented thus far, does not allow us to
challenge the implicit notion that the changes made to PPBS
by the Carlucci Initiatives and the two preceding
innovations, resulted in better budgetary decisions.
However, we now have the basic information to analyze the
results of these changes, relative to the success of PPBS in
the DOD.
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V ANALYSIS OF THE FINDING
A. INTRODUCTION
The preceding four chapters have sought to provide the
reader with a broader perspective of the evolutionary
process which PPBS. in the DOD has undergone during its
twenty-five year existence. Using the three basic questions
established at the beginning of the study, this analysis
will address the findings relative to the question.
B. The Problem Leading to the Introduction of PPBS
The first research question addressed the underlying
reasons for the introduction of PPBS.
The findings on the Pre-PPBS problem of the DOD discusses
some of the fundamental issues of budget reforms. The
problems to which PPBS was to solve were not new but
revolved around the issue repeatedly emphasized in budget
reform literature, i.e., the introduction of planning
considerations at the front end of tne budgetary process.
As chapter II indicated, prior to PPPBS there was no
practical connection between planning done by the military
component in the DOD and the budgeting, a responsibility of
the civilian component. As we have seen, what integration
of planning and budgeting did exist was in name only. The
Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) which was supposed to
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kick off the budget process with a "complete and thorough"
statement of defense policy was not able to resolve
disagreements on what the defense policy should be. Instead
of providing specific guidance, it became a statement of
generalities acceptable to all. For this reason, its
utility as a basis for developing the follow-on planning
document, the Joint .Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) was very
much diminished. As a result of each service's
interpretation of the generalities of the guidance, budgets
were prepared that enhanced the services own parochial
interests. Lacking a mechanism for monitoring cross service
plans and programs, the DOD was faced with duplication of
efforts and neglect of important missions.
There is no unanimity among the literature reviewed,
that the recognized problems of the tradi-tional budgeting
process offered a complete explanation for the introduction
of PPBS. Numerous other explanations are suggested. However
the prevalent theme of this study is that PPBS was
instituted to correct the various problems, evident in
traditional budgeting. The point to be made here is that
bona fide problems were perceived and a rational sounding
corrective alternative was offered in by PPBS.
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C. The Impact of Evolution
The second research question sought to discover what
effect the various innovations to the PPBS process had on
the practical budget process of DOD.
PPBS was conceived as a better way of making budgetary
decisions in DOD. In 1961 it became DOD's formal process
for making resource -allocation decisions. As this study has
pointed out, PPBS has been in a state of constant evolution
since its introduction into DOD.
After reviewing the major innovations (management by
objectives, zero-base budgeting and the Carlucci
initiatives) of the PPBS evolutionary process, the
literature leads us to two conclusions. First, despite
widely publicized attempts, over two and a half decades and
five presidential administrations to implement new
innovations to the DOD's PPBS, few if any substantive
changes to the practical process itself have occurred.
Second, as a result, the impact on the overall budget
operation in DOD during this period has been minimal.
However, disregarding this minimum role that the various
innovations played in influencing the actual budget process
in practice, these innovations went a long ways toward
establishing PPBS as a national symbol of organization
control in the DOD. Moreover, it sent a very clear signal
to the constituents that someone new was in charge and
something was being done.
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In each of the innovations discussed in this study, a
case can be made for the symbolic function that it was
designed to perform. Aimed primarily at managing the
relationship between the DOD and those environment factors
discussed in the study introduction, the changes to PPBS can
be viewed in some respect, as symbolic gestures of
accommodation.
When we look historically at the character of the
activities surrounding each of the major innovations the
patterns are familiar. What becomes very visible is the
politics of the follow-on political party (we are cleaning
up the other guy's mess); the well publicized change (a new
and better way) and the reorganization (we now have the
right people in the right jobs). This type of image
building activity has been associated with each of the PPBSs
innovations and suggests that this symbolic role may prove
to have the more significant impact on the overall budget
process in the DOD.
D. Still Unresolved Problems
The final research question in this study focused on the
issue of still unresolved problems after over 20 years of
PPBS evolution. The focus of the discussion will begin from
the perspective of the Carlucci Initiatives described in the
last chapter.
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Despite what appeared to be the ambitions efforts of the
first term Reagan Administration to improve PPBS, the
Carlucci Initiatives were not perceived in the literature as
totally satisfactory. In the mid-1980 f s criticism of the
PPBS process began to emerge which led to several
"comprehensive" reviews of PPBS. For instance, in 1982, the
Center for Naval Analysis sponsored a conference on PPBS to
.look at the system "past, present, and future." Intended
primarily for internal DOD edification, the conference
included participants who were past and present
practitioners, both military and civilian. In 1985, the
Joint Department of Defense/Government Accounting Office
Working Group on PPBS published their findings and
recommendations. In 1985, the staff of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services published their report on the need for
changes to the DOD organization.
These new studies of PPBS are not limited to the
government; other literary sources had renewed their
attention to this subject. Emerging from this increased
review of the PPBS process are some of the more common
perceptions of the problems that still prevail. The list of
a few of the perceived problems includes many familiar
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The Focus Of Resource Allocation Remains On The Budget
Year
Despite the creation of the Five-year Defense
Plan, and despite design features of PPBS that were
supposed to ensure a multi-year perspective, the
system continues to emphasize budgeting as a year-to-
year exercise. There is a direct relationship between
this perceived shortcoming and that of the failure to
effectively link planning to budgeting.
The Information Systems Supporting PPBS Have Become
Unwieldy
The evolution of PPBS has led to the creation of a
variety of data bases, used for various purposes
throughout the cycle. Instead of a single, uniformly
understood and applied information system, DOD and the
services have created a plethora of overlapping and
potentially confusing systems.
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Budget Execution Is Largely Ignored
A perennial problem since PPBS was instituted; has
that the system emphasized budget formulation
rather than execution. The absence of effective
feedback creates the potential for continuing
ineffective program expenditures and prevents
correction of serious problems. In effect, the issue
is one of total system control.
E. SUMMARY
The findings in response to the three research questions
suggest a uniform pattern of information. First, that PPBS
was conceived in response to what was perceived as bona fide
problems in defense budgeting. Next, the impact of the PPBS
evolution and the numerous innovations had been minimal,
relative to the budgetary practices of DOD; but major in
terms of legitimatizing the process. Finally, the strongest
of the patterns identified, is the constant reappearance of
the familiar concern over "budgeting problems", a concern
voiced in the early 1960s' and still being voiced today.
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VI CONCLUSION
In the next two years PPBS will be approaching its
twenty seventh anniversary in the DOD. Once again the
budget process may be subject to yet another series of
changes, promptd by the arrival of a new Presidential
Administration. The findings presented in this thesis,
suggests that PPBS played more of a reconciliation role for
the previous four new Administrations. When viewed in their
context it seems highly possible that the changes made to
the PPBS process over the years, were often made in an
attempt to acquire some legitimacy, relative to the
environmental factors which must be accommodated.
The findings also attest to the attractive roles that
the concern over "budgeting problems" performed in
legitimatizing the process. Without what are perceived as
bona fide problems in defense budgeting which requires
solutions, it is difficult to implement the sort of rational
sounding corrective measures needed for image building.
This concept simply stresses that the survival of PPBS
requires it to not only meet the budgetary needs of the DOD,
but also help maintain a viable coalition of supporters, who
are concerned about defense budget problems; problems that
may have no solutions, but are more than compensated for by
other apparent benefits.
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The original search on the literature focused on three
questions for which this study has addressed. However,
there are a number of questions worthy of futher study as a
spin off of this study. Suggested areas for futher study:
(1) The relationship between PPBS and the policy.
Can specific changes in policy be traced directly to
PPBS?
(2) How does the Congress really regard the PPBS in the
DOD?
(3) What is the real role of PPBS in the decision-making
process of the DODs resource allocation?
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APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BNSP Basic National Security Policy Document
ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense
CINCS Commander-in-Chief of the Unified and
Specified Commands
DG Defense Guidance
DOD Department of Defense
DRB Defense Resources Board
FYDP Five-Year Defense Plan
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSOP Joint Service Objectives Plan
MBO Management of Objective
0MB Office, Management and Budget
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
POM Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
ZBB Zero Based Budgeting
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